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Introduction 
 
 
Egypt’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections 
Weakened Parliament, Weakened Parties 
Nadine Sika 
According to the roadmap for political transformation announced in July 2013, Egypt’s 
parliamentary elections should have taken place six months after the constitutional 
amendments. Yet, since then, they have been postponed several times. They are now 
scheduled for March and April 2015. Until recently, the regime has been reluctant to 
hold parliamentary elections, fearing an unruly parliament not dominated by a regime 
party, as in the past. In June and December 2014, the government enacted a new elec-
toral law and an electoral district law, which will reduce the chances of political parties 
in general – and political opposition parties in particular – from gaining a substantive 
number of seats in parliament. By deliberately impeding political parties from playing 
an important role in parliament, the regime is just adding to its own volatility. There-
fore, priority should be given to pushing for the inclusion of all political forces in the 
electoral process and the strengthening of political parties. 
 
After the ouster of Mohamed Morsi from 
power in July 2013, the then Minister of 
Defense, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, announced 
a roadmap for political transformation. 
Three major milestones were sought to 
enhance the legitimacy of the new regime: 
the rewriting of the 2012 constitution, 
followed by a national referendum; parlia-
mentary elections; and presidential elec-
tions. In September 2013 interim president 
Adly Mansur appointed a constitutional 
committee of 50 individuals, which was 
charged with revising a constitutional draft 
proposal of a 10-member committee that 
had also been appointed by Mansur. The 
committee of 50 was composed of members 
from different syndicates, unions, official 
religious institutions and public figures. 
Political parties were granted six seats; the 
Islamist political current was granted two 
(one for the Salafi al-Nour Party and one 
for an Islamist thinker who was a previous 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood). The 
constitutional referendum took place in 
January 2014. A few days later, Mansur 
announced a “slight” change in the road-
map, with presidential elections to precede 
parliamentary elections. Presidential elec-
tions were held in May 2014, leading to a 
clear-cut victory for al-Sisi. Parliamentary 
elections are now scheduled to begin on 21 
March 2015. Yet, the meddling with parlia-
mentary elections provides the observer 
with mixed messages concerning today’s 
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politics in Egypt. Why is the regime not 
enthusiastic about parliamentary elections? 
Is it due to the irrelevance of these elections 
or the government’s reluctance in dealing 
with a parliament that might be host to its 
political opposition? 
The Legal Framework 
Both the 2012 and the 2014 constitutions 
mirror the uncontested dominance of the 
military in Egyptian politics. The 2014 con-
stitution reinforces the 1971 constitutional 
arrangement of a strong executive and a 
weak parliament. The parliament does not 
have oversight of the military budget, nor 
does it have power over the decision to go 
to war. The main competencies granted to 
parliament in the constitution concern 
the right to approve general economic and 
social policies, the national budget (barring 
the military budget) and de jure oversight 
of the executive branch. The president 
has the right to dissolve parliament (Article 
137) after acquiring approval through a 
referendum. The president has the right 
to appoint the prime minister with the 
agreement of a simple majority in par-
liament. In case there is no such vote of 
confidence, the article gives the president 
the right to dissolve parliament without 
a referendum. 
The impediments to a strong parliament 
are not only found in the constitution, but 
lie also in the 2014 parliamentary election 
law. This law proposes a mixed electoral 
system that has both a candidate list and 
single member district representation. The 
system allows 420 parliamentary seats for 
single member candidates and 120 seats 
for closed list candidates. The remaining 
27 seats of the 567-seat legislature shall be 
appointed by the president. Both the can-
didate list and the individual candidates 
are elected through a winner-takes-all sys-
tem. In addition, the 2014 electoral district 
law divides the country into 232 districts, 
for individual candidacies, and 4 districts 
with electoral lists, where the winning list 
takes all allocated seats. 
The effects of these two laws will further 
weaken the already weak political parties 
for two main reasons. First, the low number 
of seats chosen through electoral lists pro-
vides political parties the chance for com-
petition beyond just the 120 parliamentary 
seats. On the other hand, the 420 seats allo-
cated to single member districts are more 
likely to be won by well-connected individ-
uals or businessmen who can provide their 
constituents with goods and perks in order 
to win their district seats. Second, it was 
customary that independent candidates 
who won parliamentary elections became 
co-opted into the National Democratic Party 
(NDP). Thus, political conflicts or rivalries 
between different individuals were resolved 
under the party umbrella. Yet, today, with 
no dominant party and a weak party sys-
tem, individual candidates will most likely 
remain independent without party affilia-
tions, further fragmenting parliament 
along individual interests. 
Earlier Parliaments 
Although the results of parliamentary 
elections under Husni Mubarak were 
always known to be in favor of the then-
ruling NDP, elections and parliament also 
served as important conduits for the con-
testation, cooptation and legitimation of 
the political order. The presence of oppo-
sition forces in the political process in gen-
eral – and in parliament in particular – gave 
Mubarak the internal and international 
legitimacy needed to assert his rule. 
Though he ensured the presence of oppo-
sition in various parliaments, Mubarak 
weakened the opposition by ensuring that 
they would not gain more than 10 percent 
of parliamentary seats. In 1984 and 1987, 
when political parties that were aligned 
with the Brotherhood won almost 30 per-
cent of seats, these parliaments were dis-
solved by the Supreme Constitutional Court 
on account of being “unconstitutional.” 
The 2010 parliamentary elections were 
mired in electoral fraud, which led to an 
unprecedented exclusion of the opposition 
SWP Comments 1 
January 2015 
2 
from parliament. Of the 508-seat parliament, 
the opposition – both secular parties and 
the Brotherhood combined – won only 15 
seats. As a consequence, when political ac-
tivists mobilized for an end to the Mubarak 
regime in January 2011, opposition parties 
quickly joined in. 
After the ouster of Mubarak from office, 
an electoral law with mixed proportional 
representation and single member districts 
was enacted. The results of the first post-
Mubarak parliamentary elections in Novem-
ber 2011 and January 2012 showed a marked 
weakness of the secular forces vis-à-vis the 
Islamists. The two major Islamist blocs, 
led by the Brotherhood and the Salafists 
together, won a majority of more than 70 
percent of parliamentary seats. However, on 
the basis of earlier precedents, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court dissolved this parlia-
ment as well in the summer of 2012. 
Electoral Coalitions 
The leadership’s reluctance to hold par-
liamentary elections can be traced to the 
lack of one dominant political party. Unlike 
his predecessors, President al-Sisi does not 
have a party that can work as a political 
machine to guarantee him support for 
presidential policies in parliament. 
Some attempts have been made by pub-
lic figures, such as Amr Moussa, former 
Secretary-General of the League of Arab 
States and former presidential contestant, 
to build one large coalition to counteract 
the Salafi and Brotherhood’s dominance of 
the 2012 parliament. Such a coalition has 
not materialized, however. Rather, rivalries 
and disputes had led to three main secular 
coalitions by December 2014. In January 
2015, one of these coalitions split up: the 
Egyptian Front Coalition, which was com-
posed of some staunch supporters of the 
military, such as the Congress Party, led by 
former presidential candidate Amr Moussa. 
The backbone of the coalition – the Con-
gress Party, the Unionist Progressive Party 
and the Tomorrow Party – were the major 
parties to leave. 
The Egyptian Wafd Coalition, which 
mainly consists of the Wafd and the 
Egyptian Social Democratic Party, is still 
holding together. Also, the Civic Democrat-
ic Current remains intact, which consists 
of new political parties established after 
the Mubarak regime, such as the Constitu-
tion Party, founded in 2010 by Mohamed 
El Baradei, the former Director-General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
In December 2014 Abdel Gelil Mustafa, 
the former coordinator of the National 
Association for Change – an association 
established by El Baradei – attempted to 
unite these coalitions to put together joint 
candidate lists for the proportional repre-
sentation districts. These lists have strong 
support from the Egyptian Front and its 
splinter parties in addition to the Civic 
Democratic Current. However, the extent 
to which this support would hold is still 
unclear. These shifting and fragmenting 
alliances are a reflection of the secular 
political parties’ weakness. So far, they 
have shown themselves to be incapable of 
building a coalition for the four candidate 
lists, which would make up only a third 
of the upcoming parliament anyhow. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the 
Islamists are also fragmented between 
the Brotherhood, the Salafis, the Gamaa 
Islamiyya and the Islamist political parties 
of Misr al-Qawiya and al-Wasat. Against 
the background of the imprisonment of all 
high-ranking Brotherhood officials, the 
banning of their party and the crackdown 
on their rank-and-file members, these par-
ties have very few options for mobilizing 
votes for elections. Moreover, the Brother-
hood is itself divided, with some supporting 
participation in parliamentary elections 
“under cover” and others in favor of a boy-
cott. In addition, the government has been 
restricting the Salafis’ presence in mosques, 
which were important venues for mobiliza-
tion during the 2011/2012 parliamentary 
elections. 
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Outcomes of the 2015 Elections 
The likely outcome of the upcoming elec-
tions is a parliament dominated by fractured 
secular parties and individuals and busi-
nessmen, with a minority of religious par-
ties, mainly the Salafi al-Nour Party. The 
political parties represented in the secular 
political camp are likely to include members 
of the Egyptian Front Coalition and its splin-
ter groups, the Wafd Coalition and the Free 
Egyptians Party, which was one of the new 
parties established after the ouster of Muba-
rak and is funded by business tycoon Naguib 
Sawiris. Together, these parties would func-
tion as al-Sisi’s mouthpiece in parliament. 
The January 2015 meeting of President al-
Sisi with the presidents of these parties is a 
clear indication of his preference for such a 
balance in parliament. It is also remarkable 
that the only Islamist parties invited to the 
meeting were al-Nour and Misr al-Qawiya. 
The latter, however, did not participate. 
The opposition parties would consist 
of the Civic Democratic Current, represen-
tatives of which were also invited to the 
meeting by the president but were not 
able to attend. In any case, this coalition’s 
presentation will likely be very weak. In 
the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, a 
similar coalition, called “the Revolution 
Continues,” was not able to receive more 
than 3 percent of seats. 
The religious camp will be divided 
along the Salafi al-Nour Party, the Gamaa 
Islamiyaa’s al Binaa wa-l-Tanmeya Party, and 
the moderate Misr al-Qawiya and al-Wasat 
parties. Even if the Brotherhood were to not 
opt for a boycott, with the current govern-
ment’s crackdown on it and the freezing 
of its leaders’ financial assets, it would not 
have the means to mobilize votes. 
Given all these splits and internal dis-
putes among the secular parties preferred 
by al-Sisi, the Islamists’ fragmentation and 
weakness, and the weakness of the Civic 
Democratic Current, the upcoming parlia-
ment is likely to be very weak. This will 
further increase the power of the executive 
branch, even more than the constitution 
and the legal framework have provided for. 
Parliament and Instability 
The weaknesses that are bestowed upon the 
legislature and on political parties through 
the constitution and laws, in addition to 
the political parties’ own internal struggles, 
will be detrimental to the development of a 
strong parliament. Yet, a strong parliament 
is an important pillar for any participatory 
and democratic system, even in terms of 
authoritarian stabilization, and allows for 
the inclusion of a wide range of political 
forces that could voice opinions within the 
formal institutional structures. Last but 
not least, having a strong legislative body 
could potentially enhance good govern-
ance, through effective oversight of the gov-
ernment. State stability and good govern-
ance are the basis for economic develop-
ment, which Egypt is in dire need of. Effec-
tive political parties are also essential for 
enhancing stability, as they could channel 
popular demands into the political sphere. 
In contrast, weak political parties are likely 
to result in more protest and tumult on the 
streets. 
Germany and its European partners 
should reassert their commitment to a more 
stable Egypt. This can be done by pressing 
for the inclusion of all political currents in 
free and fair parliamentary elections and 
through assistance to all political parties 
via joint programs between European and 
Egyptian political parties. Political dialogues 
should be held by European political par-
ties and their Egyptian counterparts to 
exchange political knowledge and skills in 
internal democracy and coalition-building 
processes. 
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